Second Workshop (online)

Epistemic Questions

21–23 April 2021



17:00–18:30 (BST/UTC+1) Ori Beck (Ben‑Gurion) 

'Naive Realism vs. the Science of Consciousness'

18:45–20:15 Mike Martin (Oxford) ‘The Lure of Illusion: Diaphaneity Served Two Ways’

20:15-20:30: Discussion


17:00–18:30 Peter Epstein (Brandeis) 'Spatial Experience: More Than Mere Structure'

18:45–20:15 Imogen Dickie (Toronto) 'Property Perception and the Atomist Dilemma Resolved at Last'

20:15-20:30: Discussion


17:00–18:30 Dominic Alford-Duguid (Oxford) 'Whence Come Properties Before the Mind?'

18:45–20:15 Jessie Munton (Cambridge) 

'Seeing Things as They Are is Seeing Things as They Could Be'

20:30–22:00 John Campbell (UC-Berkeley)

‘What Difference Does Grasp of a Shared Language Make to our Perception of Properties?’

22:00-22:15: Concluding Remarks and Discussion


Perception permits us to think and know about what we perceive. Upon seeing an object for the first time, you are in a position to form thoughts about it that you would express with sentences like ‘that is tall’ or ‘that is red’.


Whatever role perceiving objects plays in anchoring this variety of thought about objects, we can ask: does property perception play a parallel role for our capacity to form perception-based thoughts about sensible properties, and is this the case for all or only some sensible properties?


If more is required of property perception—and many assume that it is—then this imposes substantive constraints on the right account of property perception. Yet if more is required, what is it about properties and, relatedly, perception-based thought about properties that imposes these demands?