A philosophical project dedicated to developing an integrated approach to property perception
When hallucinating, you fail to perceive an object: you seem to perceive one, but no object is there to be perceived. By contrast, many philosophers believe that hallucinations permit you to perceive properties; e.g. colours, shapes, etc. What is it about property perception that explains this asymmetry?
Property perception generates a number of such puzzles, yet so far researchers have adopted a piecemeal approach to them. Our project will develop a unified approach that investigates a triad of concerns: concerns about the metaphysics of perceived properties, about what is involved in property perception, and about what role property perception plays in thought. These concerns generate three sorts of questions:
-
METAPHYSICAL questions concerning the relationship between property perception and the metaphysics of properties, where the latter will include, inter alia, claims about what distinguishes
properties from objects.
-
EPISTEMOLOGICAL questions concerning the role that property perception plays in underwriting our ability to think and know about the world.
-
PERCEPTUAL questions concerning the relationship between property perception and other aspects of our more general capacity to perceive the world.
Addressing them as a unified set will reveal property perception’s oft-unrecognised significance for perceiving and conceiving of the external world.
We will investigate these issues through a series of workshops hosted by the University of Oxford and generously supported by the John Fell Fund.